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PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
Case No. 17622 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff to recover for personal 
injuries suffered in an automobile collision with Defendant, 
an uninsured motorist, in July, 1977. Appellant, Plaintiff's 
insurance carrier, appeals from the denial of its Motion to 
Intervene as a party defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was commenced in April, 1979, in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. Thereafter, 
partial summary judgment of the issue of liability was granted 
against Defendant based upon his admission, in his affidavit, 
that he had caused the collision. Appellant moved to intervene 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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as a party defendant, which motion was denied. 
Appellant filed its Petition for Intermediate Appeal 
on or about March 23, 1981, which was granted by Order of this 
Court dated April 2, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an Order of this Court 
affirming the decision of the lower court denying Appellant's 
attempt to intervene as a party defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant having accurately set forth a summary of the 
facts giving rise to this matter, Plaintiff-Respondent concurs 
therewith. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PLAINTIFF 
HAS NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE TORT 
ACTION AGAI~ST AN UNINSURED DEFENDANT. 
a. 
The status of the law in Utah clearly 
prohibits intervention. 
The question presently before this Court has been 
previously addressed and this Court has consistently reached 
the same conclusion: the insurance carrier is not a proper party 
to actions in tort such as the present one. That determination 
was reached both in the case of a plaintiff attempting to include 
the insurance carrier as a party, Christensen v. Peterson, 
25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971), and in the case of an 
insurance company attempting to join itself in the action. 
-2-
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Kesler v. Tate, 28 Utah 2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 (1972). See also, 
Wright v. Brown, 574 P.2d 1154 (Utah, 1978). 
This Court set out the rationale for its determination 
in Christensen, stating essentially three separate bases: first, 
that it constituted prejudicial error to inject deliberately 
a disclosure of insurance coverage in a personal injury trial; 
second, that it was generally improper to join an action in tort, 
the primary action between Plaintiff and Defendant, with a sup-
plemental action sounding in contract betweer. Plaintiff and the 
insurance carrier; and finally, that it is intolerable to place 
the parties in a position' where che insurer's interest is to 
defeat the claim of its own insured, citing Holt v. Bell, 392 
P.2d 361, 363 (Okl. 1964). 
The law as it exists in Utah is correct, both from a 
legal standpoint and an equitable one. It should remain un-
changed, despite the challenges of Appellant, which are addressed 
hereafter. 
b. 
Appellant will be deprived of no con-
stitutional right by failure to allow 
intervention. 
It is entirely correct, as Appellant asserts, that one 
whose interests may be affected by judicial proceedings is 
entitled to the due process of law guaranteed by Utah Const, 
Art. I, §7: the right to be heard, with all of the procedural 
safeguards and opportunities the term "due process" entails. 
The fundamental misconception of Appellant in the present case 
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is its assertion that it has such a protectable interest; it 
does not. 
The case before this Court is one sounding in tort 
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. No allegation has been 
made that Appellant has committed a wrongful act rendering it 
liable to Plaintiff for damages, nor could such an allegation 
be sustained. This action seeks merely to establish that Plain-
tiff has been harmed, that the person causing that harm is the 
DefEn1ant, and the extent of that harm. None of these things 
involve or implicate the Appellant for tort liability. 
Appellant's relationship with the Plaintiff, on the 
other hand, stems from a contract between the two whereby 
Appellant, in exchange for a fee, agreed to provide Plaintiff 
with insurance protection. Appellant's interests are affected 
only if and when it is called upon to perform under its contract; 
i.e. when a money judgment is awarded to Plaintiff against the 
Defendant who, by virtue of his uninsured status, is unable to 
satisfy it. In other words, the Appellant's obligation matures 
only after the satisfaction of a condition precedent, the resol-
ution of the tort action in favor of Plaintiff against an unin-
sured Defendant. 
At such time as Appellant is called upon to perform 
under its contract, and it questions the validity of that con-
tract or its required performance, it may seek redress in the 
courts. Certainly due process requires no more than this. 
Due process does not require that Appellant be allowed to inter-
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vene in this action, one totally distinct from an action to 
interpret the contract of insurance. The mere possibility that 
Appellant, at some future date, may be required to do what it 
has promised to do is insufficient to require Appellant's entry 
into this suit, which is solely between Plaintiff and Defendant 
herein. 
Appellant's assertions that failure to allow it to 
intervene herein will result in the Plaintiff and the uninsured 
motorist conspiring :0 obtain a judgment and an unlimited award 
of damages is without foundation. Appellant seems to disregard 
the necessity of Plaintiff meeting her burden of proof and dis-
counts the ability of the courts to ensure legitimate pro-
ceedings. Surely the Appellant can not have so little faith in 
the judicial system. Plaintiff will receive a judgment for 
damages only if her case is proved by competent evidence, and 
only to the extent warranted by that evidence. The trial Court 
is fully capable of maintaining the integrity of its proceedings 
without Appellant's presence as watchdog. 
This is so even if, as Appellant seems to assume, the 
Defendant will not actively contest the measure of damages. 
That assumption is not necessarily correct, however. The Defen-
dant is not excused from his liability solely by virtue of his 
status as an uninsured motorist. He will be subject to any 
award of damages Plaintiff receives against him, and it cannot 
be assumed that the Defendant will have no interest in keeping 
such an award as low as possible. 
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Similarly, Appellant's assertion that it will be 
denied due process because it is prohibited from asserting any 
type of defense is groundless. Appellant may, if called upon 
to perform its contract, assert any and all defenses to that 
contract which it has available. No further protection is 
needed by Appellant, and no more is given any person in like 
circumstances. Nor will that, as Appellant asserts, result 
in a second trial of the same issues. Appellant's obligation 
is contractual and, shou~~ a dispute arise, the issues to be 
determined would concern the contract. As noted above, Appellant 
has no interes~ in or standing to raise defenses to the tort 
action, and such issues would be inappropriate in any dispute 
between Plaintiff and Appellant. The two cases being entirely 
distinct, there would be no violation of the principle of 
judicial economy, since the same issues would not be litigated 
twice. 
Appellant's interests with, and obligations to, Plain-
tiff being entirely separate and distinct from those involved 
in this suit between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Appellant 
having full recourse to the courts at some later date if need 
be, there is no violation of due process in preventing Appel-
lant's intervention herein. 
c. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, does not require that Appellant's 
intervention be allowed. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for 
-6-
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intervention " ... (2) when the representation of the applicant's 
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the 
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action •••• " 
This rule, then, requires three elements for intervention to be 
allowed, all of which must be present: an interest in the 
action; inadequate representation of that interest; and a judg-
ment which may be binding on the applicant. As will be seen, 
none of these elements exist in the present suit with regard to 
Appellant. 
1. An interest in the action -- As has been previously 
noted, Appellant has no interest in the instant action, which is 
in tort and exists between Plaintiff and Defendant. Appellant's 
interest lies in its contractual relationship with Plaintiff, 
which is not involved in this suit. Appellant's liability is 
secondary, arising only upon the conclusion of the present 
action favorably to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's invoking her con-
tract with Appellant. 
This Court recognized the distinction of interests 
in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979), an action for 
personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. In that 
case, the Plaintiff, believing his injuries minimal, executed 
a release naming both the Defendant and his insurer, State 
Farm, in exchange for payment from the insurer. Subsequently, 
the Plaintiff's condition deteriorated, he rescinded his release 
and brought suit against the Defendant. At trial, Defendant 
sought to vacate the trial setting because the insurer had not 
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been named as an indispensable party. The motion was denied 
and Plaintiff was awarded a judgment. In affirming that the 
insurer need not be made a party, this Court said: 
State Farm has committed no act making 
it liable in tort to Plaintiff, as has 
defendant. State Farm did, however, con-
tractually bind itself with defendant~e 
insured, to compensate persons such as 
plaintiff in the event of a collision caused 
by defendant. State Farm's liability to 
plaintiff arises only secondarily, through 
its contractual arrangement with defendant, 
and the release agreement itself cannot 
alter State Farm's liability to defendant 
under the terms of contract between them. 
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his 
act1on against the actual tortfeasor, not 
the insurer. The fact that plaintiff signed 
a release agreement which named the insurer 
as a releasee does not change the nature 
of the rights between plaintiff and the 
insurer; plaintiff has no direct cause of 
action against the insurer which he could 
release. Plaintiff's only cause of action 
lies against defendant, which is an action 
in tort. 
596 P.2d at 1039 (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 
While in Campbell the insurer was that of defendant 
where here it is that of Plaintiff, the distinction between the 
insurer's interest in contract and the parties' interest in tort 
is equally applicable in the case at bar. Appellant's interest 
lying in contract with Plaintiff, it has no interest in the pre-
sent suit justifying intervention under Rule 24. 
2. Inadequate representation -- Appellant having no 
interest in the present litigation, it can not be said that its 
interests will be inadequately represented. Nevertheless, as 
stated above, it can not be assumed that Defendant will not 
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attempt to minimize the damages which might be awarded against 
him, since he will be liable thereon notwithstanding the exis-
tence of uninsured motorist coverage. Further, the burden 
placed upon the Plaintiff to satisfy the fact finder by competent 
evidence of the extent of damages suffered will more than ade-
quately protect Appellant from any attempt at having the amount 
of such damages established, through collusion, as a higher 
figure than justified. It might be noted, perhaps unnecessarily, 
that Plaintiff has no intention of ;~llowing such a course of 
action at any rate. 
l.:_ Binding judgment -- Any judgment rendered in this 
action will be against Defendant, not Appellant. As such, the 
judgment will not bind Appellant. Appellant's obligation to pay 
Plaintiff will arise, if at all, from its contract with Plain-
tiff, and that contract likewise determines the extent of 
Appellant's liability. 
While it is true that the award of a judgment against 
Defendant may signal the time when Appellant's obligation arises, 
this is so not because the judgment acts directly upon Appellant 
but because the contract, as drafted by Appellant, sets forth 
that occurrence as the condition upon which Appellant shall per-
form on its contract. Similarly, the amount of a judgment 
against Defendant may determine the extent of Appellant's lia-
bility to Plaintiff, but again not merely because it is a judg-
ment but because Appellant's contract utilizes that amount as 
the computation of Appellant's obligation to pay. This is readily 
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seen from the fact that, regardless of the size of judgment 
rendered against Defendant, Appellant will be obligated to pay 
no more than the limit set forth in the contract between it and 
Plaintiff. 
Finally, Plaintiff could not execute upon the judgment 
against Appellant. Plaintiff could only, upon the award of a 
judgment, seek to enforce her contract with Appellant. Appellant 
could then assert any defenses to that contract it may have and 
ultimately seek the protection of the courts, if need be. Only 
upon the resolution of any litigation to interpret and enforce 
the contract, should that become necessary, would there be a 
judgment binding upon Appellant. Of course, it is readily 
apparent that in any such litigation Appellant would of necessity 
be a party, rendering it unnecessary that Appellant become a 
party herein. None of the requirements of Rule 24 having been 
met in this case, intervention is not permissible pursuant the~~. 1 d. 
Public policy requires that intervention 
be denied. 
This Court noted in Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 
2d 411, 483 P.2d 447, 448 (1971), citing Holt v. Bell, 392 P.2d 
361, 363 (Okl. 1964), that: 
[w]hen the parties are placed in a 
position where the interest of an insurer 
is to defeat the claim of its own insured, 
the position of the parties is such that the 
court cannot countenance the situation. 
The placing of the parties thusly virtually 
makes the ,1aintiff's insurer the liability 
insurer of the defendant and interested 
in defeating plaintiff's claim. 
Such is the case at bar. 
-10- • 
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Appellant herein drew up the contract of insurance 
between it and Plaintiff, established the conditions to be met, 
determined the requirements under which it would provide coverage, 
set the premiums to be paid by Plaintiff and otherwise dictated 
the terms of the contract. It can be safely assumed that Plain-
tiff had no input in the drafting of the contract; she could 
accept the terms or take her business elsewhere. Plaintiff 
accepted the contract and performed thereunder by paying the 
specified premiums and meeting the other requirements ~hereof. 
Certainly this Court cannot now tolerate Appellant's attempt, 
after reaping the benefit of Plaintiff's full performance under 
the contract, to take a position antagonistic to Plaintiff's 
interests and essentially defeat the contract it itself had 
fashioned. To do so would be unjust and unfair. 
Appellant could have included in its contract the right 
to enter into litigation such as this with a position hostile 
to its insured; it failed to do so. The legislature, in pro-
viding for uninsured motorist coverage (Utah Code Ann. 
§41-12-21.l (1967)), could easily have foreseen the very situ-
ation present before this Court and explicitly provided for the 
insurer's right to intervene; it did not. Plaintiff, by sug-
gesting these alternatives, intimates no opinion on their en-
forceability, but merely asserts that if such an anamolous 
result as Appellant proposes is to be accepted, it be explicitly 
and clearly provided for before the contract is entered into. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of Appellant's attempt to intervene in this 
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action contrary to Plaintiff's interests contravenes neither 
the right of due process nor the provisions of Rule 24. Appel-
lant has no interest requiring its intervention in this pro-
ceeding, and may avail itself fully of any defenses it may have 
to its contract at such time as it is called upon to perform. 
To allow Appellant to enter and attempt to defeat Plaintiff's 
interests under the contract between Plaintiff and Appellant 
would be manifestly unfair. 
The ~~wer Court's order denying intervention is correct 
and should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of October, 1981. 
HAVAS AND HAVAS 
,// / ~ Lf_--_ 
BY: _ /- - ~"~ .';:: ( t:"~/' ~ / ~~/- _ i(_ 
EDWARD B. HAVAS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Harrison Place, Suite 216 
3293 Harrison Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 399-9636 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to Timot~ 
R. Hanson of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, 175 South West Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attorneys for Intervenor-Appellant; 
and to Earl Chambers, Eden, Utah 84310, Defendant-Respondent, 
Pro-se; postage prepaid this~ day of October, 1981. 
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